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When Giving Almost Becomes a
Taking:
An Analysis of Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida
Department of Environmental
Protection
Peter Spencer*
I. INTRODUCTION
In June of 2009, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to review a unique takings claim involving beachfront
property.1 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida
Department of Environmental Protection2 ("STBR") began in 2004
when beachfront property owners opposed a state decision to
restore approximately seven miles of white sandy beaches. 3 This
beach restoration project essentially expanded an eroded beach by
creating a strip of publicly-owned beach situated between the
* Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law, 2011; Master of
Marine Affairs Candidate, University of Rhode Island, 2011; B.S., Brigham
Young University, 2004. I want to express many thanks to my beautiful wife,
Erin, for her patience, love, and support for me and our wonderful boys,
Samuel and Benjamin.
1. Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Fla. Dept. of Evntl. Prot., 129 S. Ct.
2792, 2793 (2009).
2. 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2613 (2010), aff'g Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1106 (Fla. 2008).
3. Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1106.
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private beachfront property and the Gulf of Mexico. 4 After the
issue made its way through the lower state courts, the Florida
Supreme Court determined that the legislative statute that
permitted and directed this state action did not violate the
Takings Clause. 5 It was this decision that was appealed to the
United States Supreme Court and was later granted certiorari. 6
Legal scholars anticipated that the Court's ultimate decision
would likely do one of two things: (1) reinforce the tenet that
individual states are the sole reservoir of authority to define laws
of real property within their respective states, or (2) create a new
and unprecedented category within takings jurisprudence known
colloquially as a "judicial taking."7 While the judicial taking
theory has been discussed for years in both academia 8 as well as
Supreme Court dicta, 9 the establishment of this theory as a legal
doctrine has never been effectuated. The ripple effects of this
decision could be felt by every coastal community in our country. 10
Indicative of the widespread impact the decision will have is
the number of amicus briefs submitted to the Supreme Court for
the case-which includes over half of the nation's state attorneys
general, the United States Solicitor General, and two dozen
interest groups. 11 On June 17, 2010, nearly a year to the day
4. Fraser Sherman, Supreme Sand Skirmish, DESTIN LOG, June 15,
2009, http://www.thedestinlog.com/common/printer/view.php?db=destinlog&
id=9655.
5. See Walton Cnty., 998 So.2d at 1121.
6. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 129 S. Ct. at 2793.
7. Ben Barros, What's At Stake in Stop the Beach Renourishment,
PROPERTY PROF BLOG (July 1, 2009), http:/Jlawprofessors.typepad.com/propert
y/2009/07/whats-at-stake-in-stop-the-beach-renourishment.html.
8. See W. David Sarratt, Judicial Takings and the Course Pursued, 90
VA. L. REV. 1487, 1488 (2004); Roderick E. Walston, The Constitution and
Property: Due Process, Regulatory Takings, and Judicial Takings, 2001 UTAH
L. REV. 379, 379-80 (2001); David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of
Custom: Beach Access and Judicial Takings, COLUM. L. REV. 1375, 1375-79
(1996); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449,
1449-50 (1990).
9. See Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1207 (1994)
(Scalia, J., dissent from denial of certiorari); Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S.
290, 291 (1967); Sauer v. City of New York, 206 U.S. 536, 541-42 (1907);
Muhlker v. New York & Harlem R.R. Co., 197 U.S. 544, 570 (1905).
10. Alex Denis, Destin Renourishment Case Goes National, WJHG NEWS,
Oct. 7, 2009, http://www.wjhg.com/home/headlines/63708872.html.
11. Jennifer Koons, Supreme Court's Regulatory Takings Case Draws
Widespread Interest, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/
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after granting cert, the United States Supreme Court handed
down its decision on this novel and closely-watched case. 12 While
the Justices were unanimous in upholding the Florida Supreme
Court's decision that no taking of private property occurred, the
larger, more impactful decision regarding the existence of a
"judicial takings" doctrine divisively split the Court four to four. 13
Meanwhile, universal acceptance, concern, and alarm
regarding the various consequences of climate change and an
increased demand for offshore energy resources has been taking
hold throughout the world's political, scientific, and societal
spheres.14 Consequences of climate change include rising sea
levels, an increase in the intensity and frequency of extreme
weather, such as hurricanes, and loss of suitable fish habitat.15
Additionally, the recent BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico is
representative of the impact of the increased need for offshore
energy sources. The costly impacts of these dramatic changes to
our environment will be most keenly felt by our coastline
communities. 16 As these significant impacts continue to intensify,
the citizens of coastal states will inevitably look to their respective
local and state governments for leadership in safeguarding their
coastline from environmental contamination and encroachment by
ocean waters due to sea level rise.17 Indeed, states have been
playing this crucial role of protecting their coastlines for over a
century. 18
Part II of this note briefly traces the history of the Takings
Clause jurisprudence, introduces the judicial taking theory,
examines how states have been commissioned to develop their
2009/1O/06/06/greenwire-supreme-courts-regulatory-takings-case-draws-w-
78107.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2011).
12. See Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot.,
130 S. Ct. 2592, 2613 (2010); Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla.
Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 129 S. Ct. 2792, 2793 (2009).
13. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2597, 2601-08,
2613.
14. Brief of Coastal States Organization as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 16-17 & n.74, Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc. v. Fla.
Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2792 (2009) (No. 08-1151).
15. See Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 521-22 &
n.18 (2007).
16. Brief of Coastal States Organization, supra note 14, at 23.
17. See id. at 35.
18. Id.
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own common law for property, and discusses the U.S. Supreme
Court's prior precedents and other academic commentary
regarding judicial takings that existed prior to STBR. Part III
sets forth the facts and legal issues of STBR, analyzes the Florida
Supreme Court's decision and provides some critiques of the
court's reasoning. Part IV analyzes the final U.S. Supreme
Court's holding, considers the various viewpoints represented in
the different opinions, and suggests additional public policy
reasons to support the Court's decision. Finally, Part V explores
what the future holds for the judicial takings theory.
II. TAKINGS GENERALLY AND JUDICIAL TAKINGS SPECIFICALLY
A. Brief History of Takings Jurisprudence
The Takings Clause of the United States Constitution,
inserted in the Fifth Amendment of the Bill of Rights, states
simply, "nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation."19 In the latter half of the twentieth
century, this Clause has taken a very active role in Constitutional
jurisprudence, especially as courts have tried to grapple with
increased government regulation of private property. 20  One
commentator described this grappling by the Supreme Court as
producing jurisprudence "as disheveled as a ragpicker's coat."21
The Supreme Court's apparent difficulty in establishing a cohesive
jurisprudence in this area of law results from the central issue of
all takings cases-the proper role of government regulation of
private property in an increasingly populated and changing
America. 22 As such, this central issue of balancing private rights
with government regulation presents "one of the most difficult
jurisprudential issues of the modern era."23
Originally, the Fifth Amendment applied only to the Federal
19. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
20. Edward J. Sullivan, A Brief History of the Takings Clause, WASH.
UNIV. IN ST. Louis SCH. OF LAW, http:/[law.wustl.eduflanduselaw/Articles/
Brief Hx Taking.htm (last visited Aug. 2, 2011).
21. William B. Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings and Due Process, 37
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057, 1059 n.ll (1980).
22. Walston, supra note 8, at 380.
23. DONNA R. CHRISTIE & RICHARD G. HILDRETH, COASTAL AND OCEAN
MANAGEMENT LAW 115 (3d ed. 2007); Walston, supra note 8, at 380.
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Government.24 It was not until the Reconstruction period, and
specifically the Fourteenth Amendment, that the Fifth
Amendment became applicable to the states, thus allowing the
federal Constitution to limit the powers of state and local
government in how states treated private property. 25
In 1922, the United States Supreme Court decided
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, which articulated the "genesis of
modern takings analysis,"26 and announced for the first time that
a government regulation of property can sometimes affect a taking
that requires payment of compensation. 27 Prior to this case,
traditional justification for a taking required direct government
appropriation or physical invasion of private property that would
result in the functional equivalent of an ouster.28 The regulation
in question in Pennsylvania Coal was a Pennsylvania law that
prohibited the mining of coal under streets, houses, and places of
public assembly.29 As a coal company, Pennsylvania Coal held
mineral rights to many properties in Pennsylvania but had sold
the surface rights to others.30 The coal company argued that the
legislation prohibiting the mining constituted a taking because it
was no longer able to mine the coal. 3 1 The Court's majority
opinion, written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, agreed by
saying that "while property may be regulated to a certain extent,
if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."32
Hence began the doctrine of regulatory takings-where
"government regulation of private property may, in some
instances, be so onerous that . . . such [a taking] may be
compensable under the Fifth Amendment." 33
The second major type of takings follows the more traditional
24. Sullivan, supra note 20; see also Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32
U.S. 243, 250-51 (1833).
25. Sullivan, supra note 20; see also Chi. Burlington and Quincy R.R. v.
City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 228 (1897).
26. CHRISTIE & HILDRETH, supra note 23, at 115.
27. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
28. Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, What Constitutes "Taking" Under
Takings Clause of Fifth Amendment, 10 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 231 § 5 (2006).
29. 260 U.S. at 412-13.
30. Id. at 412.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 412, 415.
33. Wooster, supra note 28, at § 5.
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justification and involves a literal physical invasion of property, as
is illustrated by Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.34
In this case, a New York law required landlords to allow the
installation of cable television facilities on the roofs of their
apartment buildings.35 The Court, through Justice Thurgood
Marshall, ruled that the government must compensate a property
owner whenever there is an actual physical invasion of his or her
property-regardless of how minimal. 36  In Loretto, the Court
clarified that this second, and more traditional type of "physical
invasion" of property always occurs when the government
attempts to exercise a permanent physical occupation of
property. 37
These two cases represent the two general doctrines of
takings jurisprudence where governmental actions require
compensation to the property owner: a regulatory taking or an
actual physical invasion. Nearly all the takings cases decided by
the Supreme Court have been centered on whether a legislative
statute itself is unconstitutional as drafted or whether the
executive enforcement of a constitutional statute is applied
unconstitutionally. 38 However, there exists a principle, albeit
only in theory thus far, that the third branch of government-the
judicial branch-may also have the ability to affect a takings
claim. This issue is at the heart of STBR. The next portion of this
note will explore this innovative and novel constitutional issue.
B. The Judicial Taking Theory
At the outset, it would almost appear that the term judicial
taking is an oxymoron. As mentioned above, it is more evident
that a physical invasion of property or an onerous regulation of
property by either the legislative or executive branches would
constitute an unconstitutional taking, but how could a court,
whose very nature is "to say what the law is and what it has
always been," 39 cause a property right to be unconstitutionally
34. 458 U.S. 417, 421 (1982).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 421, 438-39; see also Walston, supra note 8, at 406.
37. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-35.
38. See Sarratt, supra note 8, at 1494.
39. See id.; Sarratt, supra note 8 at 1490; see also Marbury v. Madison 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (As Chief Justice Marshall put it, "[i]t is
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taken? Under Chief Justice Marshall's traditional theory in
Marbury, "judges were thought to be like oracles, possessing
special training and ability to decipher and discover the law, but
not human lawmakers (that is, casual agents in the creation of
law)." 40 For centuries, courts have had the power to determine
the contours of property law in areas unaddressed by statutes,
and this judge-made law has continuously evolved over time, as
background principles are applied to new socio-economic
circumstances. 41 Again, legal scholars have asked, "[a]re these
'refinements' [to the common law] capable of being dramatic
enough to constitute takings?"42  To find answers to these
questions, it is first necessary to investigate how the federal
courts and Constitution apply to an area of law that has been
"reserved to the states as independent sovereigns."43
1. Property Law Is State-Made Law
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment "protects rather
than creates property interests."44  If the Constitution only
protects, but does not define property, which sovereign authority
gets to decide what really constitutes property rights in our
country? The Supreme Court has held that generally the state is
the source of property law in our legal system. 45 The Court
reasoned in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois that because property is
defined under the common law, and federal courts, unlike state
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is.").
40. See Sarratt, supra note 8, at 1490, n.18.
41. See Sarratt, supra note 8, at 1491.
42. Id.
43. See Philips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 US 469, 484 (1988);
Brief of the American Planning Ass'n & the Florida Chapter of the American
Planning Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at 30, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc.,
v. Fla. Dep't. of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010) (No. 08-1151).
44. Wooster, supra note 28, at § 4 (emphasis added); see also Phillips v.
Wash. Legal Found., 542 U.S. 156, 164 (1998) (noting that "the Constitution
protects rather than creates property interests"); Bd. of Regents of State
Coils. v. Roth 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (where the Court held that "[p]roperty
interest, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather they are
created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings
that stem from an independent source such as state law.").
45. Walston, supra note 8, at 404; see also Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd.
v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 378 (1977).
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courts, are not common law courts, that the property rights will be
determined by state law. 46 While the Constitution, under the
Supremacy Clause, "shall be the supreme Law of the Land, [which
therefore binds] the Judges in every State," "[a] State's highest
court is unquestionably 'the ultimate exposito[r] of state law,"' and
"the prerogative of [a state court] to say what [state] law is merits
respect in federal forums." 47 Indeed, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly declared that it is "unquestionably" within the state's
sphere of authority, acting as "independent sovereigns," to define
and develop the basic tenets of real property law. 48 Thus, leading
from the clearly established precedent that real property law is
developed and interpreted by state authority and not federal
authority, state courts regularly make judicial interpretations and
determinations regarding their respective state's property laws.
This development of a state's common law is "a process which is
not stagnant but fluctuates."49 If the "nature and scope of the
property at issue has been defined by a state court under state
common law," does the Supreme Court have any power to directly
review the state court's ruling?50 The property owners in STBR
explicitly tailored their appeal by encouraging the Supreme Court
"to answer one of the great open questions in takings law," that is,
whether a state judicial decision can constitute a taking of
property in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 51 The Supreme
Court has never squarely addressed the judicial takings issue per
se, but the Court has touched upon this subject in previous
concurring and dissenting opinions. 52 The following sections will
analyze what had been said on the subject of judicial takings by
the Supreme Court as well as by the academic legal community up
to the time the Court heard STBR.
46. 451 U.S. 304, 316-17 (1981).
47. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2; Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406, 425
(2008) (quoting Mullany v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975)).
48. See Brief for the American Planning Ass'n, supra note 43, at 30.
49. Brief for the Respondents Walton County and City of Destin in
Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc., v. Fla. Dep't. of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010) (No.
08-1151).
50. See Brief for American Planning Ass'n, supra note 43, at 4.
51. See Barros, supra note 7; see also Brief for Petitioner for Writ of
Certiorari at 33, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., v. Fla. Dep't. of Envtl.
Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010) (No. 08-1151).
52. See Barros, supra note 7.
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2. Supreme Court Commentary
The concept that a state court may unconstitutionally take
private property has been a legal principle that has been
consistently, albeit sporadically, mentioned in Supreme Court
jurisprudence for over one hundred years. One of the first
instances where the Court discussed the potential of a judicial
taking by a state court took place in Muhlker v. New York and
Harlem Railroad Co.53 The claim in Muhlker was that a
government-authorized construction of an elevated railway track
above a public street resulted in a taking of the abutting property
owners' easement of light and air.5a A New York state court
rejected the takings claim by determining that the property right
claimed by the owner did not exist and, therefore, could not be
taken.55  On appeal, the Supreme Court's plurality opinion
overturned the New York state court's decision of New York
property law by adopting a position, primarily through contract
law analysis, that the prior state court's holding (that the property
right never existed) constituted a taking in violation of the Fifth
Amendment.56 Thus, the Supreme Court laid the foundational
underpinnings that a state court's decision of property rights
could, in fact, be the basis of a violation of the Takings Clause.
Important to note, however, is the dissent by Justice Holmes,
where he wrote:
I cannot believe that ... we are free to go behind the local
decisions on a matter of land law, and, . . . declare rights
to exist which we should think ought to be implied from a
dedication or location if we were the local courts. I cannot
53. 197 U.S. 544, 570 (1905). This principle was first penned by Justice
Harlan as far back as 1897:
In our opinion, a judgment of a state court, even if it be authorized
by statute, whereby private property is taken for the state or under
its direction for public use, without compensation made or secured to
the owner, is, upon principle and authority, wanting in the due
process of law required by the fourteenth amendment of the
constitution of the United States, and the affirmance of such
judgment by the high court of the state is a denial by that state of a
right secured to the owner by that instrument.
Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
54. Id. at 563; Brief for American Planning Ass'n, supra note 43, at 8.
55. See Muhlker, 197 U.S. at 560.
56. Id. at 570-71.
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believe that we are at liberty to create rights over the
streets of Massachusetts, for instance, that never have
been recognized there. If we properly may do that, then I
am wrong in my assumption that, if the New York courts
originally had declared that the laying out of a public way
conferred no private rights, we should have had nothing
to say. But if I am right, if we are bound by local
decisions as to local rights in real estate, then we equally
are bound by the distinctions and the limitations of those
rights declared by the local courts. 57
Justice Holmes' strong dissent became the basis of a decision by
the Supreme Court just two years later when the Court reversed
its own stance on the judicial takings theory in Sauer v. City of
New York. 58 In this case, a property owner claimed that the city's
construction of an elevated viaduct 59 above the street and
abutting his property caused a taking of an easement of access,
light, and air above his property. 60 The Court embraced the
opinion (previously expressed in Holmes' dissent) that because
state courts are the final expositors of the meaning of state law,
there is no foundation for seeking federal appellate review under
the Takings Clause of a state court ruling on the nature and scope
of a state property interest. 61 Specifically, the Sauer Court ruled:
Surely such questions [of state law] must be for final
determination of the state court.., this court has neither
the right nor the duty ... to reduce the law of the various
states to a uniform rule which it shall announce and
impose. Upon the ground, then, that under the law of
New York, as determined by its highest court, the
plaintiff never owned the easements which he claimed,
and that therefore there was no property taken, we hold
that no violation of the 14th Amendment is shown. 62
For over half a century, it seems that the Sauer decision, which
57. Id. at 575-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
58. Sauer v. City of New York, 206 U.S. 536, 556 (1907).
59. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIoNARY 1765 (3d. ed. 1986)
(defining "viaduct" as "a bridge ... carrying a road or railroad over a valley,
river, road or other low-lying obstruction").
60. Sauer, at 541-42.
61. Id. at 549.
62. Id. at 548.
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incorporated Justice Holmes' Muhlker dissent from two years
prior, ruled the day in regards to judicial takings within the
Supreme Court by indicating that state courts' decisions could not
constitute a taking. 63
A later pivotal case, Hughes v. Washington, was decided by
the Supreme Court in 1967.64 This case involved a dispute
between a property owner and the state of Washington over
ownership and title to accretions on oceanfront property.65 The
Washington Supreme Court ruled that the ownership of the
property is governed by state law and that under Washington
State law, accretions were owned by the state. 66 Before the
United States Supreme Court, the property owner alleged that
"the Washington Supreme Court constru[ed] the state
constitution[] [by] chang[ing] state property laws regarding
ownership of oceanfront accretions." 67  The United States
Supreme Court reversed the state court's ruling and "avoid[ing]
the constitutional question arising from the change of state
property lawn [by] ruling simply that the oceanfront property
owner's rights were granted by federal patents, which are
governed by federal law," thus granting the property owner
ownership of the accretions. 68
However, Justice Potter Stewart did not allow this
opportunity to speak to a pressing constitutional matter slip by
without comment. 69 In his concurrence to the opinion, he insisted
"the case should have been decided under Washington law, rather
than federal law, and, more importantly, that the Washington
courts were subject to constitutional limits in their definition of
property rights."70 Specifically, he stated:
To the extent that the decision of the Supreme Court of
Washington . . . arguably conforms to reasonable
expectations, we must of course accept it as conclusive.
But to the extent that it constitutes a sudden change in
63. See id.
64. 389 U.S. 290, 290 (1967).
65. Id. at 291.
66. Id.
67. Walston, supra note 8, at 432.
68. Id.
69. Hughes, 389 U.S. at 296-97 (Stewart, J., concurring).
70. Id.
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state law, unpredictable in terms of the relevant
precedents, no such deference would be appropriate. For
a State cannot be permitted to defeat the constitutional
prohibition against taking property without due process
of law by the simple device of asserting retroactively that
the property it has taken never existed at all. 7 1
Thus in his concurrence, Justice Stewart acknowledged the very
real possibility of a judicial taking occurring when a state court's
decision takes away an established state property right in a
"sudden" and "unpredictable" way. 72 In STBR, the petitioners
repeatedly relied on these statements by Justice Stewart to argue
both the United States Supreme Court's prior recognition of a
judicial taking as well as justification for how the Florida
Supreme Court's decision was an unconstitutional taking. 73
Since 1994, the Supreme Court has been petitioned no less
than fifteen times to grant writs of certiorari for cases that assert
a judicial taking. 74 Indeed, some commentators have declared
that "the Supreme Court has studiously 'declined all offers to
revisit the issue.' 75 In a 1994 dissent to the Supreme Court's
denial of the petition for writ of certiorari in an Oregon takings
case, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice O'Connor, voiced his
discontent in this continual skirting of the judicial taking theory
by stating, "just as a State may not deny rights protected under
the Federal Constitution through pretextual procedural rulings,
neither may it do so by invoking nonexistent rules of state
substantive law."76 Justice Scalia further stated, "[n]o more by
judicial decree than by legislative fiat may a State transform
private property into public property without compensation." 77
Thus, as can be seen by the sporadic but reoccurring dialogue, the
judicial takings theory will continue to be a topic of discussion by
the Supreme Court until the issue is addressed head on and either
71. Id.
72. See id.
73. See Brief for Petitioner for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 51, at 25-26,
40.
74. Id. at 31.
75. Bederman, supra note 8, at 1437 (citation omitted).
76. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1207 (1994) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
77. Id.
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adopted or discarded.
3. Previous Commentary Regarding Judicial Takings
In addition to the sporadic Supreme Court dicta, the judicial
takings theory has been discussed at length in academic legal
commentary. While a good portion of the scholarly debate
regarding this theory does endorse its existence, 78 the majority of
the literature denounces it as a fallacy.79 This note does not
attempt to be a comprehensive summary of all the learned
arguments for both sides of the issue. Rather, the following
portion of this note will briefly summarize some of the primary
arguments surrounding this legal theory.
a. Advocating Recognition of Judicial Takings
In what has been termed "the seminal article on the judicial
takings problem,"8 0 Professor Barton Thompson argues that state
courts should be subject to the Takings Clause, just as the
legislative and executive powers already are, because in fact, all
three branches of government "suffer ... from many of the same
political imperfections."81 For example, Thompson posits that
Courts have the doctrinal tools to undertake many of the
actions that legislatures and executive agencies are
constitutionally barred from pursuing under the takings
protections-and pressure is mounting for courts to use
these tools. Indeed, while paying lip service to stare
decisis, the courts on numerous occasions have reshaped
property law in ways that sharply constrict previously
recognized private interests. Faced by growing
envirounmental, conservationist, and recreational
demands, for example, state courts have recently begun
redefining a variety of property interests to increase
public or governmental rights, concomitantly shrinking
the sphere of private dominion.8 2
78. See Sarratt, supra note 8, at 1491; Thompson, supra note 8, at 1451.
79. See Sarratt, supra note 8, at 1494-95 & n.33; Bederman, supra note 8,
at 1454; Thompson, supra note 8, at 1453 nn.15-16.
80. Sarratt, supra note 8, at 1494.
81. Thompson, supra note 8, at 1541.
82. Id. at 1451 (footnotes omitted).
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In his article, Thompson acknowledges that even if this theory
were validated, it is "unlikely" that the Supreme Court will find
an unconstitutional taking occurred from a lower state court
because "courts must view themselves as radically different from
the other branches of government in order to justify and validate
judicial action."8 3
Likewise, a 2004 Virginia Law Review article justifies a
judicial takings theory by arguing that the holding in the
landmark case Erie Railroad Co. v. Thompkins84 "requires that
the takings protections of the Federal Constitution apply to state
judge-made law as well as state statutes and administrative
regulations."85 The article purports that if a state truly intends
"the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a
statute or by its highest court in a decision,"86 then "the states
must accept the bitter consequences of this [holding] with the
sweet." 87 Specifically, the author argues that Erie "imposes the
obligation to treat state law created by the judiciary as real state
law" and, as such, is capable of affecting a taking. 8S The author
further advocates that courts are more apt than state legislatures
to circumvent constitutionally-mandated compensation to private
property owners by "announcing that under their background
principles of state law, the property owner never had the property
right she claims has been taken."8 9
Other commentary has envisioned two scenarios in which the
judicial takings issue can present itself.90  First, a state
legislature will pass a statute that appears to take property
rights, and upon reviewing the statue during a takings challenge,
the state court subsequently holds that the claimed property right
did not exist.91 This is the type of judicial takings claim at issue
in STBR. Second, a state court might make a major change to the
state's existing property law. 92 This allegation was the focus of
83. Id. at 1541.
84. 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938).
85. Sarratt, supra note 8, at 1488.
86. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
87. Sarratt, supra note 8, at 1528.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1490.
90. Barros, supra note 7.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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the well-known takings case Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement
Association, which was not granted cert by the Supreme Court.93
In Matthews, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the public
must be granted reasonable access to--and reasonable use of--dry
sand area of private property. 94 There, the highest state court in
New Jersey unilaterally modified the common law in the state by
requiring public access to private beach. 95 The U.S. Supreme
Court denied certiorari without commentary.96
b. Advocating for Judicial-Restraint of Judicial Over-Reaching
Much of the scholarly criticism of the judicial takings theory
has focused on two central arguments. First, the text and
historical backdrop of the Takings Clause makes a judicial taking
"anomalous." 97 Such commentary posits that the constitutional
text does not define "property" or confer any property interests;
instead, property interests are defined by some independent
source of law, usually state law. 98 This argument rests on the
premise that because state courts are the "expositors of state law,"
it would be inconsistent to hold that a state court decision that has
interpreted state law regarding property concurrently "takes" that
very property. 99 Furthermore, historical evidence suggests that
the Founding Fathers understood the Takings Clause as confined
to the government's physical appropriation of private property for
public use by eminent domain.100 Modern day evidence suggests
that the drafters' goal was to codify the general practice of
government payments for private lands and to protect private
citizens' concerns during the Revolutionary War of the military
seizing personal property. 101
93. 471 A.2d 355, 369-70 (N.J. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984).
94. See id. at 365.
95. See id.
96. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 469 U.S. 821, 821 (1984).
97. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 13, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., v. Fla. Dep't. of
Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010) (No. 08-1151).
98. See Brief for American Planning Ass'n, supra note 43, at 6; Brief for
the United States, supra note 97, at 14.
99. Brief for the United States, supra note 97, at 13.
100. Brief for the United States, supra note 97, at 13.
101. Brief for American Planning Ass'n, supra note 43, at 12-13; see also
John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern
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The second argument academics put forth against judicial
takings involves federalism concerns. Because the states are "the
ultimate expositor[] of state law,"l0 2 the judicial takings theory
involves an impermissible federal intrusion into an arena where
the Supreme Court ordinarily "defer[s] to the decisions of state
courts."10 3 This federal intrusion would potentially "skew or chill
state courts in their exposition of property law,"10 4 and fly "in the
face of the Court's landmark decision in Erie."105 The line of
reasoning that "state common law definitions of property are
beyond the direct control of the federal government" results in
respective states' property law varying over time.106  This
diversity in property law "is not to be lamented but rather
celebrated" as the intended result of our nation's federalist legal
regime. 10 7
III. CASE IN POINT: STBR
The remainder of this note will focus on the recently decided
US Supreme Court case: Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v.
Florida Department of Environmental Protection.1 0 8 This case,
rising through the Florida state courts and ultimately adjudicated
by the Florida Supreme Court in favor of the State, was appealed
by the local property owners to the United States Supreme
Court. 10 9 The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on December
2, 2009, and the Court's decision was handed down toward the
end of the Court's term, in June 2010.110
While the first official petition by aggrieved property owners
to review the state's plan to renourish the coastline did not occur
until 2004, the seeds for this appeal to the US Supreme Court
were planted in 1965, when the Florida Legislature enacted
Chapter 161, Florida Statutes, titled the Beach and Shore
Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1252 (1996).
102. See Philips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 484 (1988);
Brief for American Planning Ass'n, supra note 43, at 13.
103. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
104. Brief for the United States, supra note 97, at 16.
105. Brief for American Planning Ass'n, supra note 43, at 17.
106. Id. at 19.
107. Id.
108. 130 S.Ct. 2592, 2592 (2009).
109. Id. at 2600-01.
110. See id. at 2592.
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Preservation Act (the "Act"). 111
A. Beach and Shore Preservation Act
In recognizing the volatility and susceptibility of Florida's
beaches, the legislature determined that "beach erosion is a
serious menace to the economy and general welfare of the people
of [Florida] and has advanced to emergency proportions.'112 The
legislature further "declar[ed] that such beach restoration and
nourishment projects . . . are in the public interest," and it is "a
necessary governmental responsibility to properly manage and
protect Florida beaches . . .from erosion."1 13 Pursuant to this
responsibility, this Act provided a way for both private and public
entities to receive state permits to conduct coastline preservation
projects.114 Under this statute, any additions or accretion to the
uplands caused by such projects remained the property of the
State.i1 5  Historically, and as is typical in most states, the
common law in Florida established the Mean High Water Line
('MHWL") as the extent landward that the state could claim as
public land. 116 In other words, all submerged land as well as the
beach that was periodically covered by water due to the
fluctuations of the tide, up to the average high tide mark over a
nineteen-year period, were public lands held in trust for all the
citizens of Florida.117
Any land existing inland from the MHWL was privately
owned by the waterfront property owner.118 Because the MHWL
could gradually shift inland or seaward, over many years, as the
sea level rises or falls, the actual boundary between public and
private land would gradually shift with the fluctuations of the
water level.119 In 1970, the Act was amended to provide for the
establishment of an Erosion Control Line ("ECL").120 In areas
111. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 161.011 to .242 (West 2007).
112. Id. § 161.088.
113. Id.
114. Id. § 161.051.
115. Id.
116. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 2, Stop the Beach Renourishment,
Inc., v. Fla. Dep't. of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010) (No. 08-1151).
117. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 177.27 (West 2007).
118. See id. § 177.28.
119. See Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 116, at 2.
120. See id. at 4-5 & n.8.
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proposed for a state beach renourishment permit, a completed
survey would depict where the beach restoration would occur as
well as the location of the ECL.121 This ECL would then replace
the MHWL as the boundary between public and private land. 122
The Act was very clear to preserve any owners' property
rights to access, use, and view as well as to boat, bathe, and fish
on water adjacent to newly created public beach. 123 The Act
protected beachfront owners' right to view and access the water by
prohibiting the state from erecting structures on the new publicly-
owned beach, except those necessary to prevent erosion.124
Additionally, the Act provided for the cancellation of the ECL if
the state beach renourishment plan is postponed, stalled, or not
maintained. 125 Finally, the Act recognized and provided that, if a
beach renourishment project or an ECL cannot be reasonably
accomplished without taking private property, the taking must be
made by the requesting authority through eminent domain
proceedings. 126
B. Background to STBR
Beginning in 1995, the white sandy beaches of the City of
Destin and Walton County, Florida were repeatedly decimated by
Hurricanes Opal (1995), George (1998), and Ivan (2004), and
Tropical Storm Isidore (2002).127 Accordingly, the Florida
Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") placed these
Florida panhandle beaches on its list of critically eroded beaches,
and the city and county began a lengthy beach restoration process,
which included extensive studies and construction designs for
approximately seven miles of these beaches. 128 This preparation
work culminated in July of 2003 when the DEP petitioned for a
permit, through the Act, to begin physical renourishment of the
121. See id. at 7-8.
122. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 161.191 (West 2007).
123. Id. § 161.201.
124. Id.
125. Id. § 161.211.
126. Id. § 161.141.
127. See Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d
1102, 1106 & n.4.
128. Florida Property Owners Must Allow Beach Nourishment,
ENVIRONMENT NEWS SERVICE (Sept. 30, 2008), http://www.ens-newswire.com/
ens/sep2008/2008-09-30-094.asp [hereinafter Florida Property Owners].
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beaches in Destin and Walton County.129 A new MHWL was
surveyed and in September of 2003 an ECL was officially
recorded, which corresponded with the newly surveyed MHWL
pursuant to the Act.i 30 Within six months, adjacent beachfront
property owners, upset with the possibility of having a publicly-
owned beach created between their property and the ocean,
formed two non-profit groups which filed petitions for formal
administrative hearings challenging the DEP's notice of intent to
issue a permit.i 3i The petitions by the two groups, Save Our
Beaches and Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc., were
subsequently consolidated1 32 and the groups will be referred to
collectively in this note as "the property owners." Following an
administrative hearing, the administrative law judge rejected the
property owners' claims and recommended that the DEP enter its
final order to issue the permit.133 Finding that the permit was
properly issued according to the existing statutes and rules, the
DEP entered its final order to issue the permit to begin the
renourishment of the beach in July of 2005.134
The property owners then challenged the DEP's final order
before the First District Court of Florida, claiming that the order
was unconstitutional because it applied the statute in an
unconstitutional manner.135 Specifically, the property owners
claimed that the state, by establishing the new shoreline
boundary at the ECL, divested oceanfront property owners of their
common law littoral1 36 rights.i 37  According to the property
owners, an unconstitutional taking occurred when the state
became the owner of the newly-created beach resulting from the
restoration efforts because the new state property (and no longer
129. Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1106.
130. Id.; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 161.191(1) (West 2007).
131. See Florida Property Owners, supra note 128.
132. Id.
133. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d at 1106.
134. Id. at 1006-07.
135. Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't. of Envtl. Pot., 27 So. 3d 48, 56
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
136. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1018 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "littoral" as
"relating to the coast or shore of an ocean, sea, or lake"). While the Florida
District Court and Florida statutes use "riparian" broadly to describe all
waterfront issues, this article will use the more precise term "littoral."
137. Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1105-07.
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the private beachfront property owner) now has (1) the rights to
any future beach accretions 138 and (2) direct contact with the
water. 139 The First District Court agreed, finding for the property
owners and reversing the DEP's final order approving the
permit. 140 The Court remanded the case, holding that the DEP
must take the property through eminent domain proceedings if
the project could not be accomplished without the taking of private
property.141 In its decision, however, the First District Court
certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question of whether the
Act has been unconstitutionally applied. 142
C. The Florida Supreme Court's Decision
On appeal from the District Court, the Florida Supreme Court
observed that while the District Court "phrased its certified
question in terms of an applied challenge, the First District
actually addressed a facial challenge" in its decision.143
Therefore, the Florida Supreme Court rephrased the question
presented: "[o]n its face, does the Beach and Shore Preservation
Act unconstitutionally deprive upland owners of littoral rights
without just compensation?" 144
Because the property owners originally claimed that their
littoral property rights were unconstitutionally violated, the
Florida Supreme Court began its de novo review of the case by
exploring what littoral rights a beachfront property owner
possesses by virtue of living adjacent to the water. 145 Applying
existing law, the Florida Supreme Court declared that beach front
property owners "hold several special or exclusive common law
littoral rights: (1) the right to have access to the water; (2) the
right to reasonably use the water; (3) the right to accretion... ;
138. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 23 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "accretion" as "a
gradual accumulation of land by natural forces"). The property owners
claimed that their property right to future accretions was taken without
compensation.
139. See Save Our Beaches, Inc., 27 So. 3d at 58.
140. Id. at 60.
141. Id.
142. Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1105.
143. Id. at 1105.
144. Id. (footnotes omitted).
145. Id. at 1111.
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and (4) the right to the unobstructed view of the water."146 The
Florida Supreme Court established a baseline from which to work
from by acknowledging that it was established Florida law that
these littoral rights are private property that cannot be taken
without just compensation. 147 However, the Florida Supreme
Court qualified that declaration by stating that "the exact nature
of these rights rarely has been described in detail." 148
1. Right to Accretions
The first of the property owners' constitutional challenges
focused on the taking of the littoral right to accretions. 149 The
Florida Supreme Court distinguished the littoral right to accretion
from the other, more established, littoral rights to access, use, and
view by categorizing the right to accretions as a "contingent,
future interest that only becomes a possessory interest if and
when land is added to the [private beach] by accretion." 150 While
the Court did not reference any previous case law that categorizes
the right to accretion as any different from any other littoral right,
the Court did cite four justifications as to why the doctrine of
accretion dictates that abutting landowners gain title to any
accretions that do occur over time.151 These include the following:
(1) the law does not concern itself with trifles; (2) he who bears the
risk of erosion should also gain the benefit of accretion; (3) all
property must have an owner, and in the interest of convenience,
the abutting landowner should be the one to receive; and (4) to
preserve the littoral right of access to the water.152 With these
four reasons in mind, the Court found that the right to accretion is
a "contingent right" that arises from a "rule of convenience
intended to balance public and private interest by automatically
allocating small amounts of gradually accreted lands to the
146. Id. (citing Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v.
Sand Key Assoc., Ltd., 512 So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla. 1987); Belvedere Dev. Corp.
v. Dep't of Transp. 476 So.2d 649, 651 (Fla. 1985); Brickell v. Trammell, 82
So. 221, 227 (Fla. 1919); Broward v. Mabry, 50 So. 826, 830 (Fla. 1909)).
147. Id.
148. Id. (citing Webb v. Giddens, 82 So. 2d 743, 744 (Fla. 1955) (noting
that these rights "have been broadly and inexactly stated')).
149. Id. at 1107.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1114.
152. Id.
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[beachfront] owner without resort to legal proceedings and
without disturbing the upland owner's rights to access to and use
of the water." 153
Indeed, the Florida Supreme Court declared that the Act
sufficiently nullifies the above-mentioned four bases for why
abutting landowners should be given title to accretions in the first
place. First, any beach restoration project approved by the Act
will result in a significant addition of beach-something not
trifling enough for the court to overlook. 154 Second, the Act
explicitly clarifies that the state gains ownership and the
resultant liability of erosion and losses caused by the water, thus
entitling the state to the benefits that may occur through
accretions.155 Third, all property has a clear and designated
owner according to the recorded ECL.156 Fourth, the beachfront
owners' fundamental littoral right of access is explicitly preserved
under the Act.157 The Court concluded that the Act did not
unconstitutionally take any littoral right to accretions because
"the common law rule of accretion, which is intended to balance
private and public interests, is not implicated in the context of this
Act." 158
2. Right to Contact With Water
The second of STBR's constitutional challenges focused on the
taking of the littoral right to have the property owners' property
maintain contact with the water. 159 As mentioned above, the
Florida Supreme Court acknowledged that access to the water was
a "core littoral right" to beachfront property owners. 160 Although
somewhat related to this fundamental littoral property right of
access, the Florida Supreme Court declared that "under Florida
common law, there is no independent right of contact with the
water."161 Instead, the Court continued, contact with the water is
153. Id. at 1118.
154. Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1118.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Fla. Stat. § 161.201 (2007).
158. Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1119.
159. Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't. of Envtl. Prot., 27 So. 3d 48, 58
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
160. Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1119.
161. Id. (emphasis added).
2011] WHEN GIVING ALMOST BECOMES A TAKING
only "ancillary to the littoral right of access to the water" that
exists to preserve the beachfront owner's ability and right to
access the water. 162 The Florida Supreme Court cited numerous
cases where a taking occurred because sovereign lands were used
in a way that deprived water-front landowner's ability to access
the water, but acknowledged that Florida had never directly
addressed whether eliminating the beachfront property owner's
contact with the water constituted a taking. 163
The Florida Supreme Court used two lines of reasoning to
advocate its stance on this littoral issue. First, it again appealed
to language within the Act that explicitly protected the right of
the beachfront property owner to access the water, "which is the
sole justification for the subsidiary right of contact."1 64 The
Florida Supreme Court then looked to where the Act preserves the
right of ingress and egress and prevents the State from erecting
any structures upon the beach seaward of the ECL except to
prevent erosion. 165 It concluded by reasoning that "the rationale
for the ancillary right to contact is satisfied" by the Act. 166
Second, the Florida Supreme Court appealed to the practical
effect of the existing and non-contended common law surrounding
the traditional MHWL. The Court pointed out that the foreshore
(the wet sand between the MHWL and the actual water)
technically separates the private property from the water's edge at
various times during the tidal cycle.1 67 While this technically is
the case on a daily basis, it has never been considered to infringe
upon the beachfront property owner's littoral right of access or
right to contact the water. 168 Before concluding its point in this
matter, the Court does acknowledge that the State is not free to
"unreasonably" distance the oceanfront private property from the
water by "creating as much dry land between [the private]
162. Id.
163. See id. at 1119; see also Webb v. Giddens, 82 So. 2d 743, 745 (Fla.
1955); Thiesen v. Gulf, F. & A. Ry. Co., 78 So. 491, 501 (1918); Ferry Pass
Inspectors'& Shippers'Ass'n v. White's River Inspectors'& Shippers'Ass'n, 48
So. 643, 646 (1909).
164. Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1119:
165. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 161.201 (West 2007).
166. Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1119.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1120.
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property and the water as it pleases."169 Rather, there is "a point"
where such a separation would materially impair the adjacent
property owner's ability to access the water, thus resulting in an
unconstitutional taking of a fundamental littoral right of access,
not contact. 170 The Court chose not to articulate further on what
this "point" is that would effectuate a taking, leaving that matter
for future cases.
Concluding by reaffirming that its holding was strictly limited
to the context of restoring critically eroded beaches under the
Beach and Shore Preservation Act, the Florida Supreme Court
held that, on its face, the Act does not unconstitutionally deprive
oceanfront property owners of littoral rights without just
compensation. 171 Similar to the common law, the Act reasonably
balances "between public and private interests in the shore."'172
Both by maintaining the beachfront property owner's ability to
access the water and by nullifying the underlying reasons for
rights to accretions, the Act properly and constitutionally
effectuates the State's duty to protect Florida's beaches and
protect private property. 173
D. Critique of the Florida Supreme Court's Decision
Because the Florida Supreme Court's decision was a four to
two vote, there exist two dissenting opinions. The major
dissenting opinion, drafted by Justice Lewis, was "substantially"
agreed to by the other dissenting judge, Justice Wells. 174 The
vigorous dissent claimed that the majority "butchered" Florida
property law and used "tortured logic" to create "dangerous
precedent."175 By focusing mainly on the issue of contact with the
water, the dissent points out that the Florida law defines littoral
property as property that "is contiguous to, abuts, borders,
adjoins, or touches water."176 The dissent maintains that this
definition captures "the legal essence of littoral or riparian land"
169. Id. at 1120 n.16.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1120-21.
172. Id. at 1120.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1121 (Wells, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 1121 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 1122 (footnotes omitted).
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and that "the land must touch the water as a condition precedent
to all other riparian or littoral rights."177 The dissent argues that
littoral property rights consist of actual property and quotes prior
precedent of the Florida Supreme Court as "littoral property
rights . . . include the following vested rights: (1) the right to
access to the water, including the right to have the property's
contact with the water remain intact."1 78
By emphatically focusing on the technical definition of how
littoral property is defined and trying to emphasize that contact
with the water is just as fundamental as the right to access, the
dissent is guilty of focusing on the letter of the common law, while
the majority chooses to focus its reasoning more on the spirit of
the common law. Also, while the dissent tries to establish each
littoral right as mutually exclusive, substantively isolated, and
supported by past precedent, the majority chooses to take a more
nuanced approach to what it believes is the varying status of an
evolving corner of property right in Florida. The dissent sees
contiguity with the sea as an inherent and essential nature of
privately held littoral property. 179 The dissent also contends that
the Act can and should be applied by the state in a constitutional
manner. 180 Specifically, rather than creating an artificial
boundary by recording the ECL, the dissent sees the better way to
apply the Act would be simply to continue to use the MHWL as
the boundary between private land and public domain.18 1 The
dissent's application of the statute in this manner is problematic,
however, in that the state would be using public funds to restore
and create additional property that will eventually be a windfall
for the adjacent private property owner.
In addition to the dissent's disapproval, there are other areas
in the STBR opinion where the majority is subject to criticism.
First, in its attempt to explain away the reasons why the doctrine
of accretion does not apply when the Act is followed, the Court
gives short shrift to some of the burdens and risks imposed upon
beachfront property owners. The Court is correct in noting that
177. Id. (emphasis in original).
178. Id. at 1123 (quoting Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Trust
Fund v. Sand Key Assoc., Ltd., 512 So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla. 1987)).
179. Id. at 1126.
180. Id. at 1127.
181. Id.
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the risk of erosion is eliminated from the private property owner
when the State takes ownership of the newly restored beach-but
erosion is only a part of the bundle of risks beachfront property
owners face. Other risks besides erosion that the landowners bear
include property damage to any built structures due to flooding or
severe weather due to direct exposure to the ocean. While the
state will own the beach, the oceanfront property owner still has
to bear these separate risks of storm surge damage to existing
development.
Second, the majority posits that "the sole justification for the
subsidiary right of contact" is the right to access the water. 182
This shortsighted conclusion by the majority does not acknowledge
other, less tangible justifications for the right to contact the water.
For example, maintaining contact with the water might also
inhibit an increase in the general public utilizing the beach area
between private property and the water. Additionally, there may
be somewhat of a subconscious ideal of having one's property
touch the water without anything in between-an ideal that is
represented in the price someone is willing to pay for the property.
To a lesser degree, this ideal is represented when a purchaser of
property is willing to pay a premium for the lot that abuts a
national forest or national park as opposed to abutting a public
recreational trail.
Third, the majority finds comfort that free access to the water
by the beachfront property owners will not be molested because
the Act itself prevents the State from erecting structures.
However, the Act includes an exception to the structure-
prohibition, "except as required to prevent erosion."18 3 Although
this narrow exception sounds innocuous enough, there very well
might be a time in the future where the State grows weary of
continually expending finite financial resources to fulfill its
statutory duty of continually maintaining the beach with
expensive renourishing projects.' 8 4 The State may look for other,
more cost-effective, ways to keep the encroaching waters at bay.
In this event, the state may look to erosion-control structures that,
while allowed under the statute, may inhibit to some degree the
182. Id. at 1119.
183. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 161.201 (West 2007).
184. See id. § 161.211.
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accessibility the abutting beachfront property owner has to the
water. Contrarily, under the traditional MHWL regime, the state
may not own or control sufficient land area between the MHWL
and the water to build similar erosion-control features. But then
again, the state always controls any submerged land and could
probably construct similar erosion-control measures regardless of
how much dry land area it owns.
Finally, the majority rests much of its holding on the fact that
the Act sufficiently codifies beachfront property owners' littoral
rights while the previous status quo held that "the exact nature"
of these littoral rights "rarely ha[d] been described in detail."1s 5
While the exact nature of these littoral rights was still undefined,
the prior common law arguably gave these littoral rights
constitutional protection.186 Although the Florida Supreme Court
never consented that these littoral rights were constitutionally
protected by Florida law, the Court did feel comfortable that the
Act maintained these rights by statute.18 7 This is the decision
that was alleged by the property owners, in their appeal to the
U.S. Supreme Court, as unconstitutionally taking their private
property.
IV. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S CONFLICTED DECISION
"After six months of undoubtedly contentious debate," the
U.S. Supreme Court's highly anticipated final decision
successfully resolved the issue presented, but failed to end the
larger constitutional debate.' 88 While the participating U. S.
Supreme Court Justicesl 8 9 unanimously held that the Florida
185. See Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1111.
186. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 31, at 52.
187. The question which arises here is whether a statute-based right is
sufficient to preclude the state from taking an alleged constitutionally
protected common law right. I am satisfied to leave the answer to this
question for another day.
188. See John D. Echeverria, Stop the Beach Renourishment: Why the
Judiciary is Different, 35 VT. L. REV. 475, 475 (2010).
189. See Tony Mauro, Behind Justice Stevens' Recusal in Florida Case,
BLOG OF LEGALTIMES (Dec. 4, 2009), http://1egaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/12
/behind-justice-stevens-recusal-in'florida-case.html (As an owner of a beach-
front condo in Ft. Lauderdale that was included in a beach renourishment
zone similar to the one involved in the case before the Court, Justice Stevens
recused himself from the case).
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Supreme Court's decision did not constitute a violation of the
Takings Clause, and thus rejected the alleged takings claim at
issue in the case, the Supreme Court was split four to four on the
more fundamental question of whether a judicial ruling can
constitute a taking, thus leaving that question undecided. 190
A. The Florida Court's Decision Affirmed: No Takings Clause
Violation
The Justices were unanimous in their decision that the
Florida Supreme Court's decision "did not contravene the
established [private] property rights," and therefore the state did
not violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.191 The
Court declined to recognize that any property right was
unconstitutionally taken from the beachfront property owners. 192
1. No Right to Future Accretions Taken
In coming to its conclusion that the State's decision did not
unconstitutionally take any property right in future accretions,
the Court first established and explained two essential processes
that occur over time within Florida property law: accretion and
avulsion. 193  Florida property law defines accretion as any
addition to dry land that "occurred gradually and
imperceptibly."1 94 Avulsion, in contrast, occurs when "there is a
'sudden or perceptible loss of or addition to land by the action of
the water or a sudden change in the bed of a lake or the course of
a stream."' 195 The Court noted how under Florida property law,
"the littoral owner automatically takes title to dry land added to
his property by accretion; but formerly submerged land that has
become dry land by avulsion continues to belong to the owner of
the seabed (usually the State)." 196  Consequently, when a new
strip of land is added to a shoreline by avulsion, the littoral
190. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't Envtl. Prot., 130 S.
Ct. 2592, 2597 (2010).
191. Id. at 2613.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 2598.
194. Id.
195. Id. (quoting Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v.
Sand Key Assoc., Ltd., 512 So. 2d 934, 936 (Fla. 1987)).
196. Id. at 2598 (citing Sand Key, 512 So. 2d at 937).
2011] WHEN GIVING ALMOST BECOMES A TAKING
property owner no longer has any rights to those accretions that
may form along the newly-exposed strip of land.
The Court classified the state's renourishment project as an
avulsion. 19 7  Thus, the accretions occurring after the
renourishment of the beach "no longer add to [the landowner's]
property, since the property abutting the water belongs not to him
but to the State."1 98
The real issue in this matter, then, was whether there is an
exception to this rule when State action actually causes the
avulsion. 199 The Court then deferred to a 1927 Florida Supreme
Court case that held that even when the State causes an avulsion,
any accretions forming on the newly-exposed State-owned lakebed
continues to be State land.200 The Court concluded that Florida
state property law clearly established that "the right to accretions
[is] 0 subordinate to the State's right to fill,"201 and that the
Florida Supreme Court's decision was "consistent with these
background principles of state property law."20 2 In sum, the
Court concluded that the Florida Supreme Court decision could
not have "taken" this right because this right--ownership of
future accretions forming on state-owned land resulting from
state-caused avulsion-did not exist. 20 3
Interestingly, the U.S. Supreme Court provided some
anecdotal commentary that in regards to the property right to
accretion, perhaps state-created avulsions should be treated
differently from other (naturally-caused) avulsions.204 However,
the Court concluded that the Takings Clause "only protects
property rights as they are established under state law, not as
197. Id. at 2599.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 2611.
200. Id. (citing Martin v. Busch, 112 So. 274, 287 (Fla. 1927); Bryant v.
Peppe, 238 So. 2d 836, 837-39 (Fla. 1970). In Martin, the Florida Supreme
Court held that when the State of Florida drained water from a lakebed
belonging to the State, thus causing land that was formerly below the mean
high-water line to become dry land, that newly formed dry land continued to
belong to the State. 112 So. at 287. In Bryant, the narrow strip of land that
suddenly emerged from below water after a hurricane belonged to the State
of Florida as well. 238 So. 2d at 837-39.
201. Id. at 2611.
202. Id. at 2611-12.
203. See id. at 2612.
204. Id.
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they might have been established or ought to have been
established." 205
2. No Right to Maintain Contact with the Water Existed
The Court also unanimously rejected the petitioner's claim
that the State took the landowners' littoral right to have their
property continually maintain contact with the water. 206
Contrary to the property owners' argument, which was based on
dicta in an earlier Florida decision, the Court held, as the Florida
Supreme Court had held in its opinion,207 that this purported
right was subsumed under the property owners' continuing right
of access to the water.208 The property owners' ability to access
the water was never taken, and the purported right to maintain
contact with the water is not founded in Florida property law. 209
Even assuming that the property owners are correct in their
argument that the Florida Supreme Court significantly changed
settled state law concerning rights to accretions and contact with
the water, the government taking these two littoral rights from
the expansive bundle of rights a property owner possesses does
not effectuate a taking under the United States Supreme Court's
precedents. 210 Indeed, the decision by the Florida Court fails to
constitute a per se taking from physical occupation of property, 211
actually taking title to property, 212 or by denying "all economically
beneficial or productive use of [the] land."2 13 Furthermore, even
under the 'ad hoc, factual' analysis 214 that follows an alleged
205. Id.
206. Id. at 2612-13.
207. Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1112, 1119-20.
208. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2612-13; see also
Michael Allan Wolf, Michael Allan Wolf on Stop the Beach Renourishment,
Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 2010 LEXIsNEXIS
EMERGING ISSUES ANALYsIS 5148, at 2-3 (2010).
209. Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1119 (noting that "there is no
independent right of contact with the water," but that it "exists to preserve
the upland owner's core littoral right of access to the water.").
210. Brief for the United States, supra note 97, at 29.
211. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
426 (1982).
212. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489-90 (2005).
213. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
214. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 322 (2002) (quoting Pa. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
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"interference with property rights 'aris[ing] from some public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to
promote the common good,"' there exists insufficient facts to
indicate sufficient harm to the property owners. 215 For example,
while the "beach restoration project here provides important
benefits to [beachfront] owners," the property owners have "made
no attempt to demonstrate that the project would reduce the
value" of their property. 216 Any ad hoc evaluation of what
monetary value has been "taken" from these property owners
would present the Court with an insufficient amount of evidence
to proffer that the property "as a whole" is so burdened that the
Takings Clause applies.2 17
B. The Judicial Takings Issue: The (Vigorous) Debate Continues
While Justice Scalia spoke for a unanimous Court in
affirming the Florida Supreme Court's decision that no taking had
occurred, "the Court was deeply divided over the [broader]
question of whether a court decision could ever effect a Fifth
Amendment 'judicial taking."' 218 This disagreement resulted in a
splintered decision consisting of a plurality decision of four
Justices, and two concurrences consisting of two Justices each. 219
1. Opening the Door for Judicial Takings: Justice Scalia's
Plurality Opinion
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion (joined by Chief Justice
Roberts, and Justices Alito and Thomas) advocated both for
declaring once and for all that a judicial decision can violate the
Takings Clause and going so far as suggesting the test for when
such a judicial taking occurs. 220 The plurality opinion reasoned
that the Takings Clause "is not addressed to the action of a
215. Id. at 324-25 (quoting Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York,
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
216. See Brief for the United States, supra note 97, at 32.
217. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 327; Brief for the United States, supra
note 97, at 32.
218. Wolf, supra note 208, at 4.
219. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130
S. Ct. 2592, 2597, 2613, 2618 (2010).
220. Id. at 2602; see also The Supreme Court, 2009 Term - Leading Cases,
124 HARv. L. REV. 179, 300 (2010).
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specific branch or branches [of government]."221 Rather, "[iut is
concerned simply with the act [of government reclassifying what
was once private property as now public property], and not with
the governmental actor."2 22  The plurality opinion's argument
continues that "[tihere is no textual justification for saying that
the existence or the scope of a State's power to expropriate private
property without just compensation varies according to the branch
of government effecting the expropriation." 223 Justice Scalia then
cites to his own dissenting opinion in a prior case, asserting that it
is "absurd to allow a State to do by judicial decree what the
Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative fiat."22 4
The plurality opinion went so far as to articulate the proper
test to be used when determining whether a court's decision
violates the Takings Clause. It first rejected the petitioner's
proposed "unpredictability test," which was derived from Justice
Potter Stewart's concurring opinion in Hughes v. Washington.225
Justice Scalia declared that such an "unpredictability test" would
be both too broad and too narrow. 226
Rather, the plurality viewed an accurate test for a judicial
taking to be "whether the property right allegedly taken was
[previously] established."227 In other words, for a judicial taking
to occur, "[t]here must be a shift in the law, and there must be a
confiscation or taking of an established private property right
221. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2601.
222. Id. (emphasis added).
223. Id.
224. Id. (citing Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1211-12
(1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting to a denial of cert.).
225. See id. at 2610; 389 U.S. 290, 296-97 (1967).
226. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2610. Justice
Scalia explains this "unpredictability test" is too broad because a judicial
property decision may not necessarily need not be predictable to be proper.
Id. An example given is a decision that clarifies property entitlements (or
lack thereof) might be difficult to predict, but that does not necessarily
eliminate established property rights. Id. On the other hand, this test is too
narrow because a judicial decision that eliminates established property
rights, even though it was foreshadowed by dicta may nonetheless still be a
taking. Id. An example in this regard is if a state court held in one case that
no property owner may own more than 100 acres. Id. Then, in a second case,
the state court applied that principle to hold that a complainant's 101st acre
to be public property. Here, the state has taken private property, even
though it might have been predictable. Id.
227. Id. at 2610.
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occasioned by the shift."228 The focus of the plurality's proposed
test for a judicial taking is not on whether the outcome is
predictable, but whether there is an "'established right' of private
property.229 The plurality's new iteration of a test for judicial
takings, while providing additional dicta for the legal community
to consider in takings cases, does attempt to advance a clearer test
of when a court goes too far in modifying property law. The
question remains, however, of what sufficiently qualifies a
property right as "established?" Certainly, if the right was
statutorily prescribed, one would be confident that such a property
right would be deemed "established." However, what about prior
case law or everyday practice or custom?
2. A Restrained Approach: Justice Breyer's Concurrence
Justice Breyer's concurrence (joined by Justice Ginsburg)
agreed with the plurality in the limited holding that the Florida
Supreme Court's decision in STBR did not constitute a Fifth
Amendment violation. 230 However, anchoring his concurrence in
a plea for judicial restraint, 231 Justice Breyer declined to engage
in the judicial taking debate, content rather with classifying the
debate as "questions of constitutional law [] better left for another
day."2 32  While he neither agreed nor disagreed with the
plurality's conclusions, 233 Justice Breyer clearly expressed a
cautionary approach on the issue, expressing his wariness to
"invite a host of federal takings claims . . . in matters that are
primarily the subject of state law."2 34 This in turn, he suggests,
would open the door for "the distinct possibility that federal judges
would play a major role in the shaping of a matter of significant
state interest-state property law."23 5
228. Wolf, supra note 208, at 6.
229. Barros, supra note 7 (citation omitted).
230. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 2592 S. Ct. at 2618 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
231. Caleb A. Jaffe & Sean M. Carney, Environmental Law, 45 U. RICH. L.
REV. 287, 312-13 (2010).
232. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 2592 S. Ct. at 2618 (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
233. Id. ("I do not claim that all of these conclusions are unsound. I do not
know.").
234. Id. at 2618-19.
235. Id. at 2619.
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3. The Due Process Possibility: Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
Justice Kennedy's concurrence (joined by Justice Sotomayor)
also agreed with the plurality in deciding that no Fifth
Amendment violation occurred. 236 Then, after agreeing with
Justice Breyer's concurrence that this case did not require the
Court to go so far as to determine whether a judicial taking can
exist, Justice Kennedy went ahead and offered a series of
arguments debunking the judicial takings theory. 237  He
concluded by purporting a separate, distinct, (and perhaps more
appropriate) Constitutional argument in which an aggrieved
property owner may seek to invalidate a court's decision-the Due
Process Clause. 238
Justice Kennedy's main objection to the idea of a judicial
taking is that the taking power is vested "for the political
branches-the legislature and the executive-not the courts. '2 39
He argued that these political branches of government are unique
in their exercising of the power of eminent domain.240 The
executive and legislative branches specifically have the
responsibility of "select[ing] what property to condemn," and
determining whether a "taking makes financial sense" for the
community. 241 Justice Kennedy also undercuts the judicial taking
theory by suggesting that the original drafters of the Takings
Clause did not envision judicial takings. 242
While it is arguable that the Founders did not foresee the
expansion of the Takings Clause to include judicial takings, that
same historical argument could have been made to curb the well-
established doctrine of regulatory takings occurring through
legislative statute or executive implementation. 243 Obviously,
this historical restriction did not impede the Supreme Court from
properly interpreting the text of the Constitution to cover the
ever-changing circumstances and society in which we now live.
236. Id. at 2613 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
237. Id.
238. See id. at 2614.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 2616.
243. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992) (citing
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)).
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Furthermore, Justice Kennedy explained that the Takings
Clause "implicitly recognizes a governmental power while placing
limits upon that power." 244 Therefore, if the Court were to find
that judicial takings exist, "it would presuppose that a judicial
decision eliminating established property rights is otherwise
constitutional so long as the State compensates the aggrieved
property owners."24 5 His concurrence asserted that there is no
clear precedent for this possibility. 246 Finally, Justice Kennedy
puts forth the theory that establishing the judicial takings theory
may have the unintended consequence of encouraging lower courts
to make more sweeping property rulings. 247 In other words,
Justice Kennedy postulates that establishing a judicial takings
doctrine in order to constrain judges, would actually empower
them with the assurance that any changes they make in property
rights can be deemed as fair and proper essentially because just
compensation will be paid. 248
Justice Kennedy also asserts that the Due Process Clause, in
both its substantive and procedural aspects, is already a "central
limitation" on the judicial power generally.249 Therefore, it is
"natural" to use the Due Process Clause, rather than the Takings
Clause, as a limit on state court property rulings. 250
Furthermore, he suggests that the "Court would be on strong
footing" if it ruled that a judicial decision that changes legitimate
and established property rights is 'arbitrary or irrational,"' and
thus unconstitutional, under the Due Process Clause. 251
C. Additional Public Policy Reasons to Affirm
While the U.S. Supreme Court's analysis was narrowly
focused on how the two property rights allegedly taken by the
Florida court's decision never actually existed as independent
244. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2614 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 2616.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 2614.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 2615 (quoting Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542
(2005)).
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property rights, other, more policy-oriented justifications exist as
to why the Supreme Court's decision was both correct and
essential. These two additional policy justifications include the
public trust doctrine and the respective state's duty to protect it
citizenry from coastal hazards.
1. Public Trust Doctrine
The public trust doctrine is a centuries-old body of common
law that holds that the sovereign state owns the shore as well as
land below navigable waterways in a special capacity for the use
and benefit of society generally. 252 Tracing this doctrine's history
to Roman law, the Institutes of Justinian provided that "[b]y the
law of nature these things are common to mankind-the air,
running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea." 253
The United States adopted the public trust doctrine as part of the
English common law. 254 With the United States Supreme Court's
approval, 255 many state courts have evolved the doctrine to reflect
the public's concern for recreation, environmental, and ecological
protection, and the preservation of scenic beauty. 256 Notably, this
doctrine has been specifically safeguarded in article ten, section
eleven of the Florida Constitution.257 Therefore, Florida has
constitutionally recognized the rights and interests of both the
beachfront property owners as well as the public in general in
regards to littoral property law. 258 If the state of Florida was
denied the ability to engage in beach restoration, not only will the
252. CHRISTIE & HILDRETH, supra note 23, at 19.
253. Id. (quoting J. INST. 2.1.pr).
254. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57-58 (1894).
255. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 484 (1988).
256. CHRISTIE & HILDRETH, supra note 23, at 20; see also Marks v.
Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 378 (Cal. 1971); Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v.
Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1094 (Idaho 1983); State v.
Trudeau, 408 N.W.2d 337, 343 (Wis. 1987). See generally, Joseph L. Sax, The
Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970).
257. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11 ('The title to lands under navigable waters,
within the boundaries of the state, which have not been alienated, including
beaches below mean high water lines, is held by the state, by virtue of its
sovereignty, in trust for all the people.").
258. Brief of Amicus Curiae the Florida Shore and Beach Preservation
Ass'n, the Florida Ass'n of Counties, and the Florida League of Cities in
Support of Respondents at 22, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla.
Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2529 (2009) (No. 08-1151).
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beachfront property owners' interests be hurt through increased
property damage, but the citizens of Florida "will invariably lose
rights guaranteed them under the public trust . . . doctrineE as
the beach continues to erode."25 9
2. State's Duty and Interest to Protect the Coastline and Coastline
Development
The State of Florida has a constitutional duty "to conserve
and protect its natural resources and scenic beauty."260  The
Florida Constitution declares that "[a]dequate provision shall be
made by law for the abatement of air and water pollution and of
excessive and unnecessary noise and for the conservation and
protection of natural resources." 261 For the simple reason that a
reversal of the state court's decision will stifle the state's attempt
to follow through with its constitutional mandate to protect its
citizenry, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision to affirm was correct.
The following policy reasons may be the most obvious-but also
may be the most persuasive as well.
It is within the best interest for the State of Florida, like
every other coastal state, to do all that it can to protect and
preserve the environmental, economic, and societal benefits that
are derived by the coast. Specifically along the Florida shore, the
sea level is rising one inch every eleven to fourteen years. 262 Over
320 miles of sandy beaches-about forty percent of Florida
beaches-are eroding enough to threaten existing developments
and recreation areas. 263  In 2006, Florida's coastal economy
generated almost $562 billion, or eighty-six percent of the state
gross domestic product. 264 Tourism is essential to the overall
economy in Florida: in 2005, nearly eighty-six million tourists
visited Florida, "making it one of the most popular travel
destinations in the world."26 5  Clearly, Florida's 825 miles of
259. Id.
260. FLA. CONST. art. II § 7(a).
261. Id.
262. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SAVING FLORIDA'S VANISHING SHORES 1
(2002), available at http://epa.gov/climatechange/effects/coastal/saving-FL.
pdf.
263. Id.
264. Brief of Coastal States Organization, supra note 14, at 13-14.
265. Id. at 15.
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fragile, sandy white beaches are one of the major contributors to
the state's overall economy and well-being. If the State is
thwarted in taking prudent and equitable steps in modifying its
own property law regarding coastline management, the State will
be severely handicapped in its sovereign Constitutional duty to
protect and provide for the general health and welfare of it
citizens.
Finally, this decision by the U.S. Supreme Court will have
lasting effects, not just on Florida but, on all coastal states'
affirmative attempts to protect themselves from the potentially
disastrous effects of climate change and the sea level rise. The
Federal Environmental Protection Agency has noted that
nationwide, about 5,000 square miles of dry land are within two
feet of high tide. 266 As such, a two-foot rise in sea level would
eliminate approximately 10,000 square miles of land-an area
equal to the combined size of Massachusetts and Delaware. 267
The coasts serve as home to over half of our nation's population, as
fifty-three percent of Americans live in coastal counties. 268
Economically, coastal counties produce more than forty percent of
our nation's economic output 269 and coastal activities contributed
over $1 trillion, or one-tenth, of the nation's GDP in the year
2000.270
Thus, if coastal states are so severely limited in their efforts
to systematically address these environmental coastal problems
due to the inability to establish necessary and practical property
laws, then these coastal states will fail in their duty to protect
their citizenry and our nation's most vibrant resources. This is
precisely why our Founders established the federalist legal regime
we have today-to allow for states to determine for themselves
what laws will uniquely benefit their citizens and contribute to
the well-being and strength of our country as a whole.
266. Coastal Zones and Sea Level Rise, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/effects/coastal/index.html (last
visited Aug. 2, 2011).
267. Id.
268. Brief of Coastal States Organization, supra note 14, at 5.
269. Id. at 6.
270. Id. at 7.
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V. THE FUTURE OF THE JUDICIAL TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
STBR apparently did not contain the specific facts necessary
to compel the U.S. Supreme Court to directly address whether the
judicial takings theory is anything more than just that: a theory.
Perhaps some future case will present the issue more directly and
thus demand from the Court a decision determining this theory's
existence in our modern legal landscape. That being the case, six
of the nine Justices on the Court indicated that state judicial
decisions regarding property rights were suspect of judicial
overreaching of some sort, whether under the Takings Clause or
the Due Process Clause. In this way, four justices plus two
justices might add up to an effective strategy for a narrow class of
property owners who can properly demonstrate how their
established property rights were taken by the judicial branch. 271
A. An Invitation for Future Litigation
While the big question of whether there can ever be a judicial
taking is still left open, STBR can also been seen as an open
invitation to other aggrieved litigants to pursue what they see as a
judicial taking claim. For example, the plurality suggests that a
litigant who loses before a state supreme court can raise a judicial
takings challenge only through a certiorari petition to the U.S.
Supreme Court. 272 However, the plurality goes on to suggest that
property owners who were not a party to the original litigation
may challenge the state supreme court's decision as a judicial
taking in lower federal courts. 273 These hypotheticals posed by
the majority certainly seem to invite aggrieved property owners to
either bring certiorari petitions to the U.S. Supreme Court or a
lower federal court, depending on their circumstances. While not
binding, the invitation by the plurality opinion, combined with the
lack of any clear guidance on any of these issues from the Court,
suggests that there may be an increase of appellate litigation
regarding the judicial takings issue. 274
For example, since STBR's June 2010 decision, there have
271. Wolf, supra note 208, at 6-7.
272. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130
S. Ct. 2592, 2609-10 (2010).
273. Id.
274. Barros, supra note 7.
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been at least two other similarly-situated cases that have been
filed for certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court. The first is a
case from Hawaii where the state appellate court held that a state
statute constituted a taking in the year it was enacted but was not
a taking of "future accretions."275 In the other case, the Montana
State Supreme Court held that riverbeds, thought to be in private
ownership or owned by the federal government, are actually
owned by the state.276 As the Court reviews these petitions, it
will need to look at the reasonableness of the state court decisions
and the state court's interpretation of its own state law. For any
judicial taking certiorari petition to be granted in the future, it
likely will need to be a case that contains the ingredients of a clear
departure from "established" state law, adverse consequences for
the property owner, and an inequitable result.
B. The Essentiality of Continued Deference to State Law
While the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed
vehemently amongst themselves regarding the reality of a judicial
taking doctrine, the Court's decision on that matter is not as
important as is the holding that the states are 'the ultimate
expositors of state law"' and that they have the authority to
interpret state law in a way that will allow them to address the
changing circumstances of their respective states.277 This being
the case, it is imperative that the vast majority of state court
decisions will and should be treated with the proper respect and
deference as currently exists in our legal structure.278 That the
275. Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana 28 v. Hawaii, 222. P.2d 441, 449-63
(Haw. 2009). The U.S. Supreme Court denied cert on November 1, 2010.
Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana 28 v. Hawaii, 131 S. Ct. 529, 529 (2010).
276. PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 229 P.3d 421, 449 (Mont. 2010). On
August 12, 2010, the cert petition to the U.S. Supreme Court was filed. On
November 1, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court invited the Office of Solicitor
General to provide an Amicus Brief regarding the controversy. PPL
Montana, LLC v. Montana, 131 S. Ct. 552, 552 (2010).
277. Riley v. Kennedy, 128 U.S. 1970, 1985 (2008) (quoting Mullany v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975)).
278. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2619 (Breyer, J.,
Concurring) (where Justice Breyer warned against the possibility that
"federal judges would play a major role in the shaping of ... state property
law"). See also id., 130 S. Ct. at 2609-10 n.9 (where Justice Scalia assures
Justice Breyer that the plurality's decision guards against that possibility:
"[t]he test we have adopted... contains within itself a considerable degree of
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Court's decision upholds this principle 279 is illustrated by the fact
that the second sentence of the entire opinion upholds the states'
ability to manage their coastlines according to their respective
laws: "[g]enerally speaking, state law defines property interests,
including property rights in navigable water and the lands
underneath them."2 80
Over a decade ago, Justice Kennedy explained that our legal
system preserves the independent sovereign status of the states
by "reserv[ing] to [the states] a substantial portion of the Nation's
primary sovereignty, together with the dignity and essential
attributes inhering in that status. The States 'form distinct and
independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject, within
their respective spheres, to the general authority than the general
authority is subject to them, within its own sphere."' 281 As has
been mentioned, the ability for state courts to interpret and evolve
their own property common law is essential in our federalist
society.
In addition to Justice Kennedy's Due Process proposal in
STBR, the United States Supreme Court has previously embraced
a theory that would allow the Court to review aggrieved property
owners without having to adopt a judicial takings theory. In
Howlett v. Rose, the Court acknowledged that it has "long held...
an independent obligation to ascertain whether a judgment
defeating the enforcement of federal rights rests upon a valid
nonfederal ground [that has] 'fair or substantial support' in state
deference to state courts. A property right is not established if there is doubt
about its existence; and when there is doubt we do not make our own
assessment but accept the determination of the state court.").
279. See Dwight Merriam, Beach Decision Draws No New Line in Sand,
CONN. LAw TRIB., June 28, 2010, http://www.ctlawtribune.com/getarticle.asp
x?id=37566 ('The winners here include the states because the Court has
shown deference to the common law of Florida."). See also Julia B. Wyman,
In States We Trust: The Importance of the Preservation of the Public Trust
Doctrine in the Wake of Climate Change, 35 VT. L. REV. 507, 514 (2010)
("[Tlhis decision is a step towards ensuring that each coastal state,
commonwealth, and territory will be able to meet its longstanding
responsibility to its citizens and the nation as a whole.").
280. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2597 (citing
Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 164 (1998)).
281. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999) (quoting THE FEDERALIST
No. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961).
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law."28 2 The key inquiry in this "fair and substantial test" is
whether, considering all the relevant facts, the decision of the
state court was purposely "designed to 'evade' or 'subvert' a federal
constitutional right."283 This test addresses the basic concern the
property owners raise in this case and allows the Court to use a
properly "highly deferential review" that is "consistent with the
principles that the state courts have the final word on state
law."28 4
While the Court in deciding this case did not specifically
promulgate a rule articulating that state court rulings on property
issues would be reviewed with deference, it strongly suggested
this would be the case. 285 In examining the alleged property
rights of future accretions and direct contact with the water, the
Court based its decision on technical readings and analysis of the
existing common law, not on the sympathetic view of the
reasonable expectation of landowners. In this way, the Court
evidenced that state action would be treated deferentially while
the reasonable expectations of landowners would not. 286
However, some commentators conclude that the Court's
holding in STBR may actually undermine this well-established
authority of state courts to determine the scope of their own
State's property laws. The argument is as follows: if a judicial
takings doctrine is established, it would encourage any
dissatisfied litigants to appeal and argue that the state court
unconstitutionally took private property anytime a state court
issues a decision that could in any way be seen as departing from
prior holdings. It is argued that this would subject a wide range of
state court holdings to unwarranted and unwanted federal review,
thus providing for "unprecedented interference with state court
authority."287
That being said, a pivotal statement, agreed to by all eight
Justices, weighs heavily on the side of continued deference to state
282. 496 U.S. 356, 366 n.14 (1990).
283. Brief for the American Planning Ass'n, supra note 43, at 33 (quoting
Fox River Paper Co. v. R.R. Comm'n of Wis., 274 U.S. 651, 655 (1927)).
284. Id.
285. Michael J. Fasano, A Divided Ruling for A Divided Country in
Dividing Times, 35 VT. L. REV. 495, 501-502 (2010).
286. Id. at 502.
287. Daniel L. Siegel, Why We Will Probably Never See a Judicial Takings
Doctrine, 35 VT. L. REV. 459, 461 (2010).
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courts: "[the Takings Clause only protects rights as they are
established under state law, not as they might have been
established or ought to have been established." 288 This sentence
acknowledges the pivotal role state law still holds in property
rights.
C. Judicial Takings Unlikely to Be Recognized in the Near Future
Reading the opinions of the various justices, it is fair to
deduce that when the Court received the petition for writ of
certiorari, the justices in the plurality saw this case as an
opportunity to at least expand on the judicial takings theory, if not
establish this theory as doctrine. 28 9  In fact, one legal
commentator suggested that Justice Scalia "has been itching for a
judicial takings claim since the Court denied certiorari in Stevens
v. Cannon Beach."2 90 In order for a petition for writ to be granted,
the traditional "rule of four" practice allows four of the nine
justices to grant a writ of certiorari, thus preventing a majority of
the Court from controlling the Court's docket.291 While this
practice is not required by the Constitution, any law, or even the
Supreme Court's own published rules, it has been the custom
since the Court was given discretion over which appeals to hear by
the Judiciary Act of 1925.292 Thus, it can be deduced that at least
the four justices in the plurality voted to grant the petition for
writ, with the hope that they could convince at least one of their
colleagues of the validity of their viewpoint.
However, in the twelve months following the writ being
granted, the plurality was unable to obtain a fifth vote for their
side, most likely a vote from Justice Kennedy. 293 This perception
is supported by the selection of Justice Scalia to write the Court's
opinion, his "vilification" of Justice Kennedy and Justice
288. Wyman, supra note 279, at 514.
289. Gary K. Oldehoff, Florida's Beach Restoration Program Weathers A
Storm in the Courts: Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Department of
Environmental Protection, 84 FLA. BAR J. 11, 19 (2010).
290. Merriam, supra note 279.
291. Henry T. Scott, Burkean Minimalism and the Roberts Court's Docket,
6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 753, 769 (2008) ("Unshackled from a caseload
dominated by mandatory Appeals, the Act established the so-called 'Rule of
Four' for granting certiorari.").
292. Id.
293. Oldehoff, supra note 290, at 19.
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Kennedy's explanation for not joining the opinion. 294 While
Justice Scalia recruited a popular tongue-twister 295 and a classic
children's novel 296  to pass judgment on Justice Breyer's
concurrence, his sharpest criticism was reserved for Justice
Kennedy. Justice Scalia not only characterized that Justice
Kennedy's concurrence as "Orwellian," 297 he also listed where he
believed Justice Kenney's previous decisions were in conflict with
his present concurrence in STBR-thus accusing him of "Lochner-
izing."298 As none of these statements were particularly gentle,
one gets the sense that the discussions in chambers over this
decision were conducted with considerable discord. 299 In light of
the criticism leveled at their colleagues, and the tenor of the
opinion, it is very likely the Justices in the plurality saw as
unlikely the Court recognizing judicial takings anytime in the
294. Id.
295. In his response to Justice Breyer's argument that there was no need
to address the underlying judicial takings issue, Justice Scalia worked in a
well-known tongue twister into the plurality opinion (the author of which
probably never thought it a U.S. in Supreme Court opinion): "Justice Breyer
must either (a) grapple with the artificial question of what would constitute a
judicial taking if there were such a thing as a judicial taking (reminiscent of
the perplexing question how much wood would a woodchuck chuck if a
woodchuck could chuck wood?), or (b) answer in the negative what he
considers to be the "unnecessary" constitutional question whether there is
such a thing as a judicial taking." Stop the Beach Renourishment Inc. v. Fla.
Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2603 (2009).
296. Justice Scalia describes Justice Breyer's approach to deciding this
case as a "Queen-of-Hearts approach" that "simply advocates resolving this
case without establishing the precise standard under which a party wins or
loses." Id. at 2604 (emphasis and internal quotations omitted). This
reference is a play on the Queen of Hearts character portrayed in the 1865
children's novel Alice in Wonderland, "who was guided more by whim than by
anything else." Fasano, supra note 285, at 501.
297. Justice Scalia suggested that Justice Kennedy's concurrence provided
an aggrieved property owner "the Orwellian explanation: 'The court did not
take your property. Because it is neither politically accountable nor
competent to make such a decision, it cannot take property."' Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2605.
298. Oldehoff, supra note 290, at 21 n.62 ("The term 'Lochner-izing'
derives its name from Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), when the
U.S. Supreme Court struck down a maximum hour law of the State of New
York. The court's decision has been characterized by subsequent
constitutional scholars as the poster child for judicial activism under the
guise of the Due Process Clause.").
299. Fasano, supra note 285, at 501.
2011] WHEN GIVING ALMOST BECOMES A TAKING 795
near future. 300 In any event, the significant divisiveness existing
regarding the issue indicates it is unlikely to be resolved in the
near future by the current makeup of the Court. 301
VI. CONCLUSION
If nothing else, the U. S. Supreme Court's attempt at
addressing the unique and complex issue of Constitutional law
moved the conversation on judicial takings to a new level. This
issue of judicial takings will grow only more pressing as coastal
states try to address climate change and the inherent coastal
environmental and economic impacts that come with it. Perhaps
the Supreme Court recognized the opportunity to provide some
needed clarity and predictability on the judicial takings issue.
Whether or not this clarity or predictability was accomplished
with a plurality opinion and two concurrences, none of which
agreed, will be seen by subsequent judicial takings litigation.
This case before the U.S. Supreme Court involved a very few
number of beachfront property owners who protested the state
from spending tax dollars in restoring and improving the eroded
beach adjacent to their property. They claimed that by doing this,
the state unconstitutionally took what they believed was their
right to receive future accretions to their property and their right
to have their property be bordered by the water. While all the
other littoral and property rights pertaining to their property are
being strictly preserved, they wanted to stop the state from
protecting the citizens generally from the many dangers
associated with climate change-including sea level rise and
increased ferocity and number of hurricanes. 30 2 Fundamentally,
no public policy should infringe upon any fundamental
constitutional right, regardless of how pressing the policy may
seem. However, the argument that property was
unconstitutionally taken in this case amounts to nothing more
than a futile legal exercise that is grasping at straws in its
attempt to fabricate a showing that a taking occurred. The U.S.
Supreme Court here, therefore, had the opportunity to "preserve
and uphold one of the most basic rights and responsibilities of
300. Oldehoff, supra note 290, at 20.
301. Fasano, supra note 285, at 501.
302. Brief for Coastal States Organization, supra note 14, at 21-22.
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sovereign states: to protect their citizens, public welfare, and
sovereign resources they manage." 30 3 As such, it did well in
affirming the Florida Supreme Court's holding in STBR and by so
doing preserved states' ability to protect their citizenry
individually, and our nation as a whole.
303. Id. at 38.
